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The principal purpose of this paper is to further the case for phronesis as a progressive coaching 
concept. It is thus argued that coaching be considered (1) as a ‘geneology’ (Foucault, 1971), (2) 
as contextualist in nature, (3) as being imbedded in the minutiae of action, and (4) as ethical 
practice. To these we add the notions of emergence and situational literacy. Although to a 
degree theory-led, we co-constructed the argument through recourse to an 18 month 
ethnographic study of the Norwegian national female handball team, and in particular the 
actions of head coach Marit Breivik during the period of investigation. What was embarked 
upon here was akin to a contested dialogue between phronetic theory and the available empirical 
data. In advocating the general case of coaching to be informed by phronetic principles, we 
reclaim the coach as a ‘competent’ practitioner, a term involving emergent self-awareness and 





This article emanated from a concern about the nature of coaching knowledge. That is, 
what is missing from the official or dominant, rather mechanistic, discourse; of the continuing 
gap between the wisdom and erudition required for coaching action and what professional 
bodies and coach education programmes espouse as legitimate know how. Kemmis (2012) 
refers to this disjuncture in as a ‘longing for something else’ not currently present. In response, 
we further the case for phronesis as a credible coaching concept. This is not only in relation to 
better understanding the term and its associated meanings, but also its development as a 
constructive framework for future coaching practice. Having its roots in one of Aristotle’s 
intellectual virtues, phronesis can be considerd as a “practical wisdom related to dealing 
ethically with context, practice and experience” (Hemmestad, Jones & Standal, 2010, p. 450; 
Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
In doing so, we build on the work of Hemmestad, Jones and Standal (2010, p. 448) who 
claimed phronetic action as being better able to take account of the “social intuition and 
complexity of coaching than many of the perspectives used to date”. Here, coaches were posited 
as making judgements and decisions in the manner of ‘virtuoso social actors’ (Flyvbjerg, 2001). 
It is a position which also develops that taken by Cassidy, Jones and Potrac (2016), who argued 
for the notion of ‘occupational value’ (Evetts, 2011) within coaching. Such a concept is to do 
with progressive flexibility and adaptations to emerging challenges; with a sense of purpose 
and contribution; and with the taking of careful judgements in highly complex situations. 
 Although we agree with others (e.g., Kinsella & Pitman, 2012) that reflective practice 
is crucial to phronetic or practical wisdom, we take issue with Frank’s (2012, p. 57) assertion 
that if “practitioners reflect enough...a kind of practical wisdom will [eventually] develop”; that 
such wisdom can germinate from deconstructive reflection alone. Rather, we contend that there 
needs to be more reconstructive insight into the nature and direction of coaches` reflections 
(Jones, 2019). Indeed, this is a criticism which can be aimed at phronetic social science itself; 
that it lacks definition in terms of practical application. Consequently, as portrayed so far, 
phronesis in coaching continues to be a rather evasive concept. 
Having said that, the purpose of this paper is not to present a clean progressive 
packaging of phronesis, but rather to open a range of guided conversations about what phronetic 
coaching could look like. In linking phronetic concepts and interpretations to critical coaching 
research, we develop the case that coaching should be increasingly considered as contextual 
practical wisdom, thus breathing informed life into, or reconceptualising, the simplistic, oft 
quoted phrase that good coaches ‘do the right things at the right times’. In terms of structure, 
we first outline the principal tenets of phronesis that have particular applicability to coaching. 
These include considering coaching (1) as a ‘geneology’ (Foucault, 1971), (2) as contextualist 
(not relativist) in nature, (3) as being imbedded in the minutiae of action, and (4) as ethical 
practice. To this we add the notions of emergence, defined as "the arising of coherent patterns 
and properties during the process of self-organization” (Goldstein, 1999, p.49), and situational 
literacy. This latter concept involves a discerning ability to ‘read’ the relational coaching 
landscape and respond accordingly; thus containing an intellectual and perceptive ‘condition of 
the mind’ (Dunne, 1993).  
Although to a degree theory led, we co-constructed the argument through recourse to an 
18 month ethnographic study of the Norwegian national female handball team (the LKS 
[Landslaget Kvinner Senior håndball]), and, in particular, the actions of head coach Marit 
Breivik (Hemmestad, 2013)1. Why did we chose this case study? Precisely because the data 
suggested, and at times spoke explicitly to, phronetic notions above others. This was 
particularly in relation to the evidenced sociality and morality of practice, to Breivik’s 
awareness of structure and agency, and an overriding desire to change a culture. A principal 
aim of the wider project then was to uncover some of the seemingly implicit professional 
competence demonstrated by a widely regarded (and internationally successful) coach. 
Consequently, as the data were read and re-read, Flyvbjerg’s ideas about phronetic action 
became primary sensitizing concepts (Blumer, 1954), whilst the unfolding findings were used 
to develop, refute, extend and qualify the framework in question (Puddephat, Shaffir & 
Kleinknecht, 2009). Although in many ways the paper can be seen as deductive in nature, where 
a theory is used to see what previously may have been hidden, the purpose was to go further 
than take advantage of ‘concept agency’ (Blumer, 1954). Hence, in deviating from phronetic 
thinking (Flyvbjerg, 2001; Hemmestad et al, 2010), the data from the case study were used to 
develop the notions of emergence and situational literacy to additionally illustrate the “living 
breathing world in question” (Puddephat et al, p.4). Consequently, following the tenets of 
socially shared cognition (Chi, 1996), what was embarked upon here was not only a 
collaboration between ourselves as researchers, but a contested dialogue between phronetic 
theory and the available empiricism. It was also an iterative process replete with exchange, re-
negotiation and subsequent mutual intelligibility. Hence, although the data were interrogated in 
relation to an existing framework (phronesis), every effort was made not to force-fit them into 
the theory. Intense reflective and reflexive action (Findlay, 2002) were thus engaged in to best 
secure an authentic engagement with both data analysis and related theory development. In 
essence, we tried to steer a course inclusive of both ‘theoretical discovery’ and ‘theoretical 
refinement’ (Puddephat et al 2009, p. 15). The objective of the paper then extended further than 
mere commentary on the virtues of ‘phronetic coaching’; a goal previously achieved earlier 
(e.g., Hemmestad et al, 2010). Rather, it was to present a rigorous illustrated case for phronesis 
as a central coaching concept, thus following Jones’s (2019) advocacy for greater ‘theoretically 
orientating’ or ‘suggestive’ work by critical coaching scholars.   
The goal of paying such detailed attention to the gradation of everyday actions was to 
both generate an insightful understanding of, and provide suggestions for, discerning coaching 
behavior. Indeed, according to Flyvbjerg, in the study of human affairs, “there is only context-
dependent knowledge” (2001, p. 71); in that, such knowledge and experience are at the very 
heart of proficient, skilful activity. For him, it is only through detailed cases and the related 
power of example that a nuanced view of reality can be developed. Similarly, for Dreyfus’s 
expert and Bourdieu’s virtuoso actor, knowledge can only be generated through intricate 
engagement with a plethora of concrete cases in respective areas of expertise (Flyvbjerg, 2001); 
a sentiment articulated earlier by the psychologist Hans Eysenk (1976), a converted critic of 
case study methods who stated: “sometimes we simply have to keep our eyes open and look 
carefully at individual cases - not in the hope of proving anything, but rather in the hope of 
learning something!” (cited in Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 73). Although this a position which advocates 
that ways of thinking and acting can be generated from a close analysis and proximity of the 
studied reality, it holds the caveat that the subsequent everyday life portrayed is not to provide 
definitive, verifiable knowledge, but rather “input for on-going [albeit guided] dialogue and 
praxis” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 115).  
 In presenting and advocating this case for phronetic coaching, we reclaim the coach as 
a ‘competent’ practitioner (Sellman, 2012). Following Sellman (2012), as opposed to its current 
common understanding of ‘skills based learning’ and attributes to be mastered, we take the term 
competence as involving emergent self-awareness and discernible judgement about both 
agency and structure in relation to contextual goings on. Here, we evoke Heller’s notion of 
‘intellect[al] rationality’; that is, a reflexive capacity to judiciously evaluate norms and 
subsequently release abilities and propensities as appropriate. Not only is this idea grounded in 
the immediate and wider critique of cultural practices, but also involves ‘anticipatory thinking’ 
and the “free play of the human spirit” (Heller, 1984, p. 129-130). In this respect, the competent 
practitioner encompasses both a critical understanding of current practice, and the abilities to 
imagine and deliver alternative horizons. We conclude the paper, not only with a summary of 
the principal points made but, through relating them to phronetic action, furthering the case for 
bringing the craft knowledge of coaching back to the fore. As argued previously (Jones, 2019), 
this is not in terms of some mythical ‘art’ of the activity, but through a clear deconstruction of 
what ‘virtuoso’ coaches do and how they do it.  
  
Coaching as Phronetic Practice 
Coaching as a geneology (Foucault, 1971) 
According to Neitzsche (1969), the genealogist writes 'real history'; real politik as 
opposed to formal politics and policies. This includes an investigation into how power 
influences (and has influenced) knowledge; into why we know what we know. Hence, there is 
no deception into an ideal; into general de-contextualised policy statements which are often 
empty and banal. The geniologist thus can be considered a diagnostic; one who unearths the 
longer continuities of cultural practices through paying attention to minor shifts, small details 
and subtle contours. Similarly, coaching (or any phenomena for that matter) cannot be 
considered as an independent manifestation or appearance, but rather as a descendant of that 
which came earlier. This was a case recently made by Jones and Ronglan (2018) who, in 
borrowing from Crossley (2011), gave recognition to interaction as sedimented in a certain past 
which allows a particular present. Although the connection between a seemingly abstract 
Foucauldian concept (i.e., genealogy) and concrete practice (face-to-face interaction) can no 
doubt be problematic, the point being made is that phenomena, however manifest or expressed, 
are related to previous events, be they a continuation of, or in opposition to. Consequently, any 
attempt at a context free definition or explanation of action, by necessity lacks understanding 
of the pragmatic way that action is understood by those who comprise it. As stated by Flyvberg 
(2001, p. 43), "a grammar is no language".  
 Although taken from a more conventional temporal viewpoint, such a perspective 
echoes that of Vygotsky, which takes as its point of departure the social-historical determination 
of human development. Here, it was argued that behavior and learning could only be explained 
through recourse to history and culture (Jones, Thomas, Nunes, & Viotto Filho, 2018). Any 
interactions (e.g., between coach and athlete) then, need to be located “within their contextual 
history; of the previous interactions between participants, and what such participants know of 
each other” to be fully understood (Jones & Thomas, 2016, p. 66). This is not to say that 
coaching (or any phenomenon for that matter) in its present guise seamlessly evolved from 
previous manifestations; in fact, the opposite is largely true. Indeed, due to the general absence 
or casualness of critical scholarship before the turn of the last century, sports coaching’s 
geneological disposition was one of ‘lighthearted positivism’; a different picture altogether 
from much of which exists today. Geneology then is able to take account of discontinuities 
without ever forgetting that such forces are always opposing or exposing something, and thus 
are related to what came earlier. The point here, as emphasised by Foucault, was to protect the 
case made against any artbitrary constructions. Consequently, by demonstrating the subjective, 
created character of institutions and phenomena, geneology creates the possibilities for 
alternative action; what things can be. 
 Within the context of this paper, it could be argued that Marit Breivik appreciated the 
nature of coaching as a historical one; that is, she was aware of the traditional performance logic 
embedded in the field (Hemmestad, 2013; Hemmestad & Jones, 2019). Consequently, any 
altered discursive practices and ways of talking had to be based on or related to previous ones. 
Far from being a prisoner of history, although cautionary and careful, what engineered here was 
not so much a gentle evolution but something of a disjuncture with the past. In her own words; 
 
…many players experience a huge difference between the coaching philosophy 
(evidenced) at the national squad and what they receive at their clubs. Thus, several of 
them have needed more time to understand ‘how we do it here’ and where we ‘want to 
go’ in several situations. This is one of the main reasons why the processes in the 
national team has moved a bit slow (at times), particularly when it comes to shared 
leadership and involvement…the players are used to getting told, with us it’s a question 
of asking them ‘what do you think? How can we approach the problem?’…it’s a 
challenge for many players, this different way of working. 
Far from being a functional process, however, it was one riddled with frustration; an emotion 
echoed by the players. In the words of one; 
If we suggest something, something we think can make us better, he (the club coach) 
does not bother to listen. We are supposed to do what he says. With the national coaches, 
it is the other way around…(they want us) to give input and to discuss matters. So that 
is frustration in the club team, because, after all, we are the ones on court. 
As stated, this change was not reflective of a clean break. Hence, although Marit was 
aware of the dominant mechanistic performance-related discourse when appointed, and had a 
desire to change it to a more egalitarian one, the rupture was very much tempered by the need 
to maintain some continuing authority in the role. Consequently, despite the creation of self-
developing ‘teams’ within her squad where responsibility for sections of play was passed to 
‘athlete groups’, Breivik still maintained a position of ‘first among equals’ in context. This was 
expressed through ensuring the problems set for the athletes to work through were bounded 
within given frames, together with the need for the latter to collaboratively discuss any potential 
solutions with the coaches. In this way, she both encouraged athletes’ engagement with the new 
discourse, while protecting them against feelings of over responsibility and her own role 
obligation as a head coach. Hence, there was change and a continuation of the same. 
 The change was also reflected in the language-in-use at the LKS. This was most 
obviously seen through Breivik’s use of metaphors, particularly associated with learning, 
improvement and growth. The orthodox language of mechanical quantitative performance was 
challenged and replaced with re-framing analogies designed to catalyze further learning through 
personal pedagogic-related progression. For example, she designated the coaching and support 
staff (including herself) as “gardeners” whose work comprised of giving the players enough 
“light, water and sun” so that they could “flourish”. In developing the horticultural theme, the 
concept of “weeding out” irrelevancies, most often as related to practices and intentions, was 
also prevalent, thus providing both focus and space for athletes to develop and “grow”. 
 History then is fundamental to understanding coaching; be it as a continuation of or a 
rupture against what went before. Unfortunately, many, if not most, coaching scholars can be 
criticised for their lack of historical sense when interpreting what they ‘see’ in their collected 
data; a criticism even more pertinent of coach educators. It is evident that not enough care has 
been taken to transform coaches' knowing into a form of knowledge. This then is the 
genealogical structure; a structure to be respected and considered when coaching.   
 
The coach as a contextualist 
We consider coaching to be context dependent; that coaching knowledge is situationally 
sensitive. Such a statement reflects a rhetorical consensus. However, unlike others, who tend to 
leave the sentiment as just that, we acknowledge the need to problematise the claim further. 
This is not so much in relation to positivistic absolutism (as no serious scholar or coach believes 
a one-size-fit-all manual is appropriate for coaching), but in drawing a distinction between 
contextualism and relativism. Flyvbjerg (2001) addresses this question through recourse to 
what he terms ‘situational ethics’; that is, the attitude to the situation or issue under examination 
within the society being studied. Consequently, as opposed to an epistemology which is totally 
relative or post-modernist in character, an ‘anything goes’ belief where coaches merely exist as 
contingent actors to context, emphasis is placed on cultural structuralism; that is, on the inter-
play between creative practice and the social structures which both restrict and enable it (see 
Jones, Edwards & Viotto Filho, 2016). In this way, idiosyncratic morality and personal 
preferences as justifications for actions are protected against. Alternatively, such motivational 
beliefs or intentions are located within the common view of the culture under study. Hence, 
although acknolwedgement of the necessity of structure is made, it is a sceptical one with 
considerable recognition given to agential, relational social power (Seidman & Alexander, 
2001).  
To say that coaching is contextualist locates it within a time and place. This is to say 
that appropriate action (that is, action considered appropriate as related to the objective) should 
be positioned within the wider discursive, cultural and temporal order of events. For 
contextualists then, knowledge depends on the context in which it is uttered, where 
intersubjective agreements are evident, with such agreements providing the structure for action. 
Contextualists also assume a background knowledge of participants; a knowledge of the social 
rules and what is meant when X says Y. It involves recognizing and using the prevalent norms 
that exist in society to generate and maintain successful social interaction.  
Bourdieu termed it as practice having “a logic which is not that of the logician” 
(Bourdieu, 1980, p. 86). What was referred to here was the practical reasoning social actors use 
to organise their perceptions and thoughts in terms of the larger whole. It is a stance which 
acknowledges the existence of a consensus or understanding regarding coaching that goes 
beyond just being ‘context dependent’, to one that is socio cultural and, hence, deeper in nature 
(Fetzer & Akman, 2002; Jones, Edwards & Viotto Filho, 2016). Contextual practice is thus 
considered to be created by, and to act upon, individuals, with coaching considered to play out 
as situated action, where interactions instigate meaning making processes. 
Consequently, although it may be true to say that contextualism is in some form 
relativistic, not only does it reject any form of ‘absoluteness’ of epistemic facts or standards, 
but simultaneously does not open the door to unbridled skepticism or relativism. Such a position 
concerns the development of what Kosík (1976) termed the ‘dialetical-critical’ method which 
“sensitizes us to the mediatedness of things, their complex interconnections, and their relation 
to the whole” (Gardiner, 2000, p. 18). In doing so, recognition is given to both socio-historical 
considerations, and the agency evident within the terrain of daily life.  
Although Marit desired change, in terms of outlook and practice, she was keenly aware 
of the wider national handball context which served as something of a relative brake on 
unbridled aspiration. Nevertheless, she was determined to challenge the given hegemonic 
orthodoxy through the advocacy of an alternative strategy, where the emphasis was very much 
on the athlete as an active contributor to the learning process. Hence, in revisiting the club 
versus national tensions cited earlier, she considered that; 
…many players need more time to understand where we are (how we do it) in the 
national team, and where we want to go. There is a huge difference between the coaching here 
(at the LKS) and (what the players get) at the clubs. This has slowed the process of involving 
and committing the players into our programme.  However, we are slowly moving the players 
to be at the centre of the process…they have to be ‘present’ all the time; they have to be stronger 
and control their own situations better.  
In relation to the liberty available (to a coach), the question can still be asked of how 
can a novel and distinctive direction be created taking account of established interests? For 
Flyvbjerg (2001), what can or should be engaged in here is a procedure of ‘dialogue’. Taking 
account of the requisite that all interactions take place within a given discourse (in this case the 
context of international sport), the point is to ascertain and decide upon a variety of viewpoints 
before deciding on the most appropriate course of action. In Nietzche’s (1969, p. 119) words 
“the more affects we allow to speak about one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we can use 
to observe [this] one thing, the more complete will our ‘concept’ of this thing be”. Taking 
account the views of others was plainly evident in Breivik’s coaching. Precisely how this was 
manifest in practice is illustrated in the examples below; 
The team are working on a tactical move, playing full court. The players are struggling 
to realise the intention; the coaches stop the practice. The coaches ask the players to go 
into groups, to talk about what ‘the problem’ is and what to do about it. [T]he coaches 
[then] call the players together to report on the decisions made (field note). 
 
At a pre-game meeting, the coaches tell the players they have full confidence in them to 
decide on the (upcoming) game strategy. The players are grouped and given tasks; what 
are our strengths? How should we use them (in the game) tomorrow? What are their 
strengths and how shall we approach them? Each group then presented 2-3 points to the 
full squad from which a game plan was developed (field note). 
 
The coaches present a short video of the (upcoming) opponents. They ask the players in 
small groups of 3 to discuss what they see and how to play – “how shall we approach 
this?” Suggestions are subsequently discussed with the larger group (field note). 
 
When questioned as to the purpose here, Breivik claimed a focus on the co-construction 
of knowledge, to draw on as many sources as possible, to produce progressive practice. 
Individual scenarios and suggested actions were thus worked through by numerous groups. 
What resulted was consensual, negotiated strategies which also affirmed the individuals who 
created them. This inclusive, collaborative means of working, however, was not reflective of 
unlimited athlete ownership or power. Alternatively, in line with contextualist thought, Breivik 
was aware of the limitations evident when implementing such ‘power sharing’. In this respect, 
she constantly pondered if the “giving of ownership” to the players was “too much” for them. 
(It was never considered she gave them too little!) In her own words; 
My idea is to make the players even more committed to the community and to [their] 
own contribution (to personal and team development). Sometimes I know I put too much 
on them… I expect too much when the players are not ready for it. Then, I need to adjust 
my actions and expectations. 
 
The athletes’ group discussions, although no coaches are often present, is always framed 
by the objectives and the intentions of the camp…“They [the players] can’t determine 
all the content of the camp…the coaches have already set some working goals, some 
frames”. 
 
It is an outlook which some have claimed bears elements of philosophical pragmatism (Dewey, 
1910, 1929; among others) whereby certain theories are regarded primarily as instruments or 
tools for coping with reality. Here, the utility of any action is dependent on its problem solving 
power, with theories needing to be modified in light of experience. Similarly, Breivik’s 
coaching carried echoes of Neurathian considerations where one cannot replace a floating raft 
all at once, just one plank at a time dependent on need and conditions; an anti foundationalist 
stance. Hence, although it was plain she wanted to change the culture at the LKS, the 
reconstruction had to be in line with contextual considerations. 
 
Coaching as being grounded in the minutiae of practice  
Although macro considerations are necessary for coaches to engage with, the emphasis 
within phronesis is on the particular. This is not so much in terms of context micro management 
and continuous detailed planning (although such planning undoubtedly has its place) but 
because it “is in the deep, [distinct] details that genuinely important interrelationships are 
[developed and] expressed” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 114). In the words of Rorty (1985, p. 173), 
“the way to re enchant the world is to stick to the concrete”; where value is placed on daily 
practices which constitute a given field of interest (Flyvbjerg, 2001). This was the case recently 
made by Jones and colleagues (Jones & Corsby, 2015; Jones & Ronglan, 2018) in ascertaining 
the importance of the quiddity or 'just whatness' of coaching. The search undertaken is for the 
"forces that make life work" (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p. 135). It is a call to further the ‘downward 
shift’ in coaching research and theorizing (Jones 2019); of the necessary engagement and 
assignation with the “inherent liveliness of (coaching) life and its time signatures” (Back, 2015, 
p. 821). It is also to develop Gardiner’s (2000, p. 5) social project into mundane daily action; 
to explore and appreciate the ‘fine grain’ and ‘connective tissue’ of coaching activities by 
critically focussing on the “practical accomplishments of skilled social actors in the course of 
their day-to-day lives”. Priority then should be given to the particular (Nussbaum, 1990), what 
Nietzsche (1968) termed as having “seriousness in the smallest of things” (p. 182).  
In partially addressing such an agenda, Jones (2019) conceptualised such practice as 
‘the work of repair’. It is work that honours the minutiae required to fulfil the social contract of 
coaching, be that between coaches and athletes, teams of coaches, or any other significant 
contextual relationship. Neglecting such attention leads to resentful rotting connections, static 
‘game’ plans, and a lack of direction, empathy and structure; “ in essence, the social rules which 
govern coaching would collapse” (Jones, 2019, p.340). Such elements of care were very evident 
in Breivik’s and the other LKS’ coaches’ practice. For example,  
…the coaches often walked back from the gym to the hotel. These were social 
encounters about what they had seen and noticed during the day. Although covering 
many issues, from individual technique and welfare to game plans and particular 
exercises, the focus was on the ‘little things’ (“She has more power now, but particularly 
so in left attacking situations”; “How was Kari today? She avoided eye contact with me 
a couple of times; I think we need to keep an eye on her”; “Susanne didn’t seem to enjoy 
it today, I’ll check with her later”; “There is something not free in Heidi’s movement; 
maybe that injury is still there? We need to find out”) (field note). 
 
The case for attention to be placed on the little things within coaching is, of course, not 
new. Suffice to say that the current study builds on earlier work (e.g., Jones, 2009; Jones, 2019), 
which previously argued for investigations into what coaches actually ‘see’ or observe in 
context, and how such observations become motivation for action. The argument made extends 
from taking care to notice ethico-political qualities of coaching relationships, to developing the 
related ‘local orderliness’ which always takes precedence over given rules. It is to resist the 
drift towards a ‘totally administered world’ (Gardiner, 2000) in relation to coaching, thus giving 
greater credence to human experience, consciousness and responsive action within the activity. 
In this respect, it is to give consideration to what Gardiner (2000) termed the ordinary, daily 
expression of care and solidarity, and Jones (2009) the ‘world of small realities’, which can 
have a lasting impact of performance. Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2001) makes the case for a 
‘knowledge of details’, the basic concerns of any action; concerns which were repeatedly 
evident in the coaches’ practice at the LKS. In agreement, we believe to better understand and 
develop coaching we should start with practice; that is, the focus should be on the everyday 
people and phenomena that constitute the field of action. This is not only in relation to better 
understanding coaching, but also as a guide to improving or changing it. 
 
The coach as a moral actor 
No claim or discussion about the coach as a phronetic practitioner can avoid the issue 
of values and morals. Although Flyvbjerg (2001) grounds his Aristotelian interpretation in what 
he terms value-rationality, little assistance is provided about what those values actually relate 
to. Indeed, it appears that the quest for appropriate virtuous or ethical coaching behavior ends 
with a call to be reflective on personal value judgements in relation to future action (Hemmestad 
et al., 2010). Perhaps that is only to be expected given the emphasis on context and adaptation. 
The counterweight offered to relativism within such thinking is that the values alluded to here 
relate to those of the wider society; that is, the moral collective climate or common view in the 
culture under study. Having said that, moral climates are subject to various changes and forces, 
resulting in ‘common sense’ shifts, for better or for worse. So, should a coach’s ethical decisions 
simply mirror those of the society he or she inhabits? 
Many have argued that coaching should be considered a ‘moral enterprise’ (see 
Hardman & Jones, 2011) with the coach as an ‘enlightened general’ engaging “athletes in a 
virtuous mutual quest for human excellence” (Loland, 2011, p. 21). Although offering some 
orientation or guidance, a better way forward would be to engage with Flyvbjerg’s admission 
that “there are rules and there is the particular” (Flyvbjerg, 2001, p.49). Here, phronetic action 
gives credence to both agency and structure, where a “degree of flexibility [is maintained] 
within given carefully considered boundaries about what is good and advantageous both to the 
individual and the social collective” (Hemmestad et al., 2010, p.450). It is this ability to take 
into account the individual, the group, and social norms, in addition to personal beliefs and 
context, that possibly marks out the phronetic thinker. Here, recognition is given to the fluidity 
of actors within and with any environment, and to the consequences of action somewhere 
always having effects somewhere else. This was  a principal conclusion drawn by Santos (2017) 
who claimed that coaches concern themselves with numerous ‘things’ (e.g., the individual and 
the collective, athlete welfare and learning, utterances and interactions, performances, in 
addition to wider expectations) in the quest to develop and demonstrate ‘caring, sensitive, 
progressive’ practice. To act ethically or morally then, requires much more than social care for 
individual athletes. No doubt the ‘unique case’ is important and needs to be treated on its merits, 
but for the phronetic coach such merits are not divorced from wider concerns. 
Again, we claim such judicious thinking was evident in Breivik’s actions as the head 
coach of the LKS. In this respect, her ideas and exploits were also reflective of ‘gagns 
menneske’; a Norwegian concept literally translated as being a ‘useful human being’. It is a 
belief related to care and consideration, more so of others than the self. The example below 
reflects such actions; 
The coaches try to find alternative ways for the athletes to demonstrate their worth. For 
instance, Jenny, very good in games but not good on this [upcoming] test. Marit steps 
in, “Hey Jenny, I want you to find a trail to run in the woods. This is your test [to] find 
an alternative for you here. Run this, then run it again when we come back next camp; 
I want to see if you’ve gone faster” (field note). 
 
Relatedly, it regards the person as having value in and of themselves apart from what they can 
do. To behave in such a way was what Breivik tried to embody and teach the players (Breivik: 
“We have to develop the individual in this holistic and moral way. As a moral person and a 
handball player”). These were actions clearly perceived by the players; 
…she really cares, not only about me as a player, but also about me as a person 
(Thrine). 
 
…that is her strength, she cares about us as people. I really think she is focused on me, 
for me to have a good life (Sissel). 
 
Although her goal was to educate the athletes (and others) within the LKS in an ethico-political 
way, Breivik was nevertheless aware of the boundaries in this regard. Such limitations related 
to living and working within a performance discourse. It was an issue which she deliberated 
upon constantly, how to merge and manage a humanistic socio-pedagogy within a culture of 
competition and the pressure for championship success. Her decisive navigation of these 
turbulent waters was helped by her conviction that more ‘rounded’, socially-aware players were 
actually better equipped to deal with the ever unfolding uncertainty of the playing context; 
attention to ‘gagns menneske’ then, simply made them better athletes. 
 
The emergent character of coaching  
In line with general complexity thinking, Higgs (2012) contends that professional work 
is characterized by an absence of certainty. It is a position reminiscent of Schön’s (1987) classic 
metaphor of such practice as a ‘swampy lowland’ where messy, confusing problems lie; 
problems that defy technical solution. Within such a perspective, action is the precursor and not 
the beneficiary of knowledge, with understanding emerging in and through the action as 
opposed to merely practicing what is already known. Indeed, for Higgs (2012, p. 77), borrowing 
from Aristotelian language, “episteme, techne and phronesis dance together” to produce the 
practice. Of course, they don’t just dance, but do so in relation to what is known and what is 
desired. In this respect, practice is considered as constructed by individuals and groups, is 
constantly evolving, while being both “situated and situational” (Higgs, 2012, p.76). In the 
words of Higgs (2012, p. 76); 
For each practitioner, not only is his or her evolving practice, knowledge and capabilities 
the result of experience and context, but each practice action or episode is influenced by 
and, optimally, shaped to suit the particular practice. 
 
The point made here is that a coach can be someone who both acknowledges emergent 
action while seeking to simultaneously shape that action. In many ways then, practice is 
considered the concurrent developer of knowledge. This is not to say that just doing something 
comes first; rather, that practice provides the context (the goals, objectives, rationales) of and 
for action. It is also a position which rejects the Descartesian dualism of thought standing behind 
action, in favour of thinking as being grounded in everyday action (Dreyfus & Hall, 1992). This 
was the case made by Jones and Wallace (2005, 2006) who, in positioning the coach as an 
orchestrator, gave credence to both the initiatory and responsive functions of coaches’ work. In 
this respect, coaching was conceptualized as an emerging phenomenon with coaches constantly 
engaged in adapting the environment towards conscious intentions. Far from being confined to 
a didactic pedagogy or interaction between a coach and athlete(s), coaching can consequently 
be better considered as comprising constant action and reaction through permeable boundaries 
between and among various agents toward a generally agreed goal (Bowes & Jones, 2006). 
There was ample evidence of such behaviour in Marit Breivik’s work; behaviour that 
both respected the emergent nature of coaching in addition to actively shaping it. For example,  
Marit calls for time-out and gathers the athletes. She starts by saying she is satisfied so 
far, before providing advice about how the performance can be improved. One of the 
athletes interrupts; agreeing with Marit, before offering an opinion. Marit nods 
supportively. The game recommences (field note). 
 
The coaches set up an exercise. It’s not working. A senior player breaks away to chat 
with another coach. The exercise is stopped, the group gathers around the coaches. The 
point made by the player is discussed and implemented in the re-started practice. The 
exercise runs better (field note). 
 
Marit’s appreciation that coaching, at best, can only be loosely scripted was further reflected in 
her objective to make the athletes curious. She constantly spoke of the need for them to 
experiment, before reflecting on that experimentation and its consequences. This was manifest 
in sessions constantly being punctuated by breaks where the coaches would challenge the 
players in terms of ‘what they saw’ and ‘how they experienced particular situations’. This 
language of discovery further emphasized or formulated the emergent nature of the practice 
which Breivik not only respected but sought to generate. Hence, rather than contest the 
uncertainty inherent in her coaching, she actively embraced it.  
 
The coach as situationally literate  
In positing noticing (Mason, 2002) and observation (Luhmann, 1995) as crucial to 
coaching, Jones and colleagues (Jones, Bailey & Thompson, 2013; Corsby & Jones, 2019) 
outlined the necessity for coaches to ‘read’ their respective working landscapes. Noticing was 
considered an act of attention with that being noticed becoming intake for action. The general 
message concerned the requirement to be more sensitive to the needs of the moment. To be 
contextually literate, however, demands more than increased consciousness to unfolding events. 
This is because “there are many things we may look at but not ‘see’, things that we ‘see’ but 
whose details we do not ‘notice’, and things we see or even take note of but do not engage with” 
(Jayyusi, 1993, p.5). It is precisely these ‘non-visible’ aspects that surround, shape and comprise 
a context that need to be seen and judiciously acted upon for contextual literacy to be claimed. 
Such literacy, of course, can be witnessed as coaches’ practical wisdom or phronetic coaching 
action (Hemmestad, et al., 2010). 
Recently, Jones (2019) argued for coaches to develop a quality of mind to practice well. 
Borrowing from Dewey (1910) and Heller (1985), the case was made that such a concept 
concerns both a critical evaluation of habit-bound norms before acting in a reasoned yet 
enlightened manner. Attention is paid to the immediate, before inferential future-orientated 
thinking characterised by “ardent curiosity, fertile imagination and experimental inquiry” is 
employed (Dewey, 1910, Preface). Such a view adheres to phronetic actions in terms of 
possessing habits of “attentiveness that makes one’s past experience flexibly available [while] 
allowing the present situation to unconceal its own particular significance” (Dunne, 1993, p. 
305). It is also a practice characteristic of Schön’s reflection-in-action, where ‘personal 
theories’ or ‘leading ideas’ are somewhat tested on the basis of contextual sense making. 
However, it could also be seen as akin to ‘reflection-before-action’ (Greenwood, 1993), where 
practice is constructed before and beyond its happening. As stated, however, such practice can 
only be fashioned from conscious and insightful acts of observation, and interpretation of those 
observations as opposed to mere experience per se. 
 The examples provided below from Breivik’s coaching bring to life such concepts; 
The coaches and players file into a meeting, before an intended practice. The players 
looked tired, they have done so for a couple of days. Breivik speaks; “ok [pause as she 
scans the room]…think about two aspects of your game that you are happy with, and 
one you want to improve. Try to visualize each scenario, work on this in the way we’ve 
spoken about…[another pause as she looks around the room again] but right now… I 
think you should relax or just go shopping!” Surprised smiles emanate from everyone 
(field note). 
 
The coaches are concerned about one of the girls. She’s very disciplined, but seems 
constantly tired, although she insists she’s fine. The physiotherapist joins her for a 
morning jog. On returning, she’s smiling, happy. She rushes to tell me they “saw a fox”. 
I later learn that the coaches had decided she should run in the woods to “rediscover the 
joy of exercise”; to “go back to nature”. She needed to be taken away from her obsession 
with set fitness times and goals; she “had to stop thinking of her body as a machine” 
(Field note).  
 
Here, Breivik had paid attention and read the context in a way that reinvigorated the athlete. 
In this way, individuals’ needs were identified and addressed to the benefit of all. 
 
Reflective conclusion 
Despite the argument having been made over the past two decades that competence in 
coaching comprises much more than merely applying sport science or of refining technique, 
the contention for coaching as involving situationally prudent judgements has still to be 
consensually accepted. Hence, while attention continues to be paid to such techne grounded 
topics as ‘technology enhanced coach education’, ‘mental toughness’, and unproblematic 
notions of athlete ‘empowerment’ (see UK Coaching’s ‘Applied Coaching Research 
Conference’, 2019), the appreciation of coaching as an emergent, contextual yet historically 
based act, remains underappreciated. Alternatively, in line with phroentic social science 
(Flyvbjerg, 2001), the goal of this paper was to further the case for coaching as work that 
demands careful and insightful thought about constructive practice. In this age of audit, self-
surveillance and quantitative data, the purpose has been to bring the astute, craft know-how of 
coaching back to centre stage. Such phronetic actions relate to the how of coaching being 
appropriately related to the intentionality of the practice.  
What we are essentially arguing for here is greater recognition of intellectual (prudent, 
judicious) work by coaches, thus conceptualising coaching as a cerebral as opposed to a 
technical activity. Phronesis, and its associated meaning of practical wisdom, has been 
subsequently offered as a framework through which to realise such a perspective. This is not 
only in terms of an abstract conceptualisation, but also by providing concrete examples of how 
such a discernment can look in practice. Equally, lest we be misunderstood here, the purpose 
has not been to prescribe tight recommendations for coaching behaviour, or even a particular 
aspect of that behaviour. Those who coach, and critically study coaching, know that the activity 
cannot be so reduced. Rather, the goal has been to advocate or provide a ‘theoretical orientation’ 
(Becker, 1982) in relation to what phronetic thinking can bring to coaching. It is an orientation 
tentatively illustrated by empirical examples thus going further than just explanatory rhetoric; 
a case of showing or suggesting as opposed to telling. Similar to the recent work of Jones 
(2019), the intention has been to both offer an alternative framework for understanding the 
coaching world, allied to provisional evocations “for how to improve [that] world” (Puddephat 
et al. (2009, p. 13-14). Finally, the paper also marked an effort to expand existing phronetic 
concepts, such as possessing an historical appreciation, paying attention to minutiae, and 
considered ethical behavior, to other, albeit related ideas, such as emergent practice and viewing 
the coach as a contextual literate. In doing so, an attempt was made to more authentically 
develop the idea of the coach as a ‘competent’, ‘practically wise’ actor.  
 
Note1. The data cited within this paper emanated from an in depth ethnography where the 
[second] author spent 18 months embedded within an elite handball context (the 
aforementioned LKS). Here, the Head Coach, Marit Breivik, inherited a high performance 
system similar to others in international sport; one dominated by metrics and explicit 
expressions of control. It was, however, one she wanted to change to better reflect constructivist 
pedagogical principles. By the time she left, the LKS had become the most successful women’s 
international handball team in recent history, with both players and coach(es) being awarded 
several national and international accolades. The precise methods of data collection within the 
study included field notes from observations, and semi structured interviews. The interviews is 
this regard more nearly resembled “casual conversations” whilst holding to an ‘implicit research 
agenda” (Fetterman, 1989, p.48). They were also linked to the observations, thus allowing 
opportunities for further probing and clarification. Utilising such sources allowed an ‘intense 
field study’ (Andersen, 1995) to deconstruct and understand the complex social phenomenon 
in question (Flyvbjerg, 2004). The aim was to capture the significance attached to contextual 
interactions, language, and beliefs (Angrosino 2007) as related to principles of phronesis. For 
a more in-depth description and explanation of the precise method(s) used in this study, see 
Hemmestad and Jones [2017]). 
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